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ABSTRACT
This paper examines purchasing transactions and ownership ties between 11 Japanese automakers
and 237 suppliers. Although atomakers' equity stakes in suppliers are highly symbolic, they play an
economic role as well. Automakers hold shares of suppliers that dedicate to them a large percentage
of output, suppliers from which they purchase many different parts, suppliers of difficult to
manufacture parts, and small suppliers, indicating that ownership stakes in suppliers are credible
commitments facilitating relationship-specific investments. Consistent with a transaction cost
interpretation but in contrast to predictions of resource dependence theory, the total number of
suppliers and the degree of an automaker's internal production of a part are not related to ownership
stakes. I conclude that embeddedness and transaction cost explanations are complementary:
embedded ties can serve as a transaction-cost minimizing governance structure. I further conclude
that buyer-supplier relationships in the Japanese automotive industry reflect a logic of commitment
rather than a logic of control and exploitation.
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INTRODUCTION
Today, there is little disagreement among organization theorists hat economic exchange is embedded
in a social, cultural, and institutional context (Granovetter, 1985). Structures of production and
exchange are influenced by the state, legal and financial institutions, the structure of social networks,
and cultural values; and for this reason, vary dramatically across countries. 
But what exactly is embeddedness? A "healthy tension," as Williamson (1994: 77) puts it, exists
betwen organization theorists and transaction cost economists over this question. On one side are
organization theorists who argue that to truly understand an organization, one must examine the
context in which it is embedded. Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton (1991: 387) for example, write:
"Different fundamental principles of control, which are not solely economic in character but rather
are drawn from other institutional sources such as the state, the community and the family, are at
work in each society. These principles inform predictable social relations in multiple arenas, including
the economic..." According to this view, universal theories of organization must be handled with
caution. Transaction cost economists, n the other hand, argue that embeddedness is simply another
factor to be modeled. Culture, social structure, legal and economic institutions serve as "shift
parameters" that change the comparative costs of governance, but do not affect the basic transaction
cost minimizing logic (Williamson, 1994: 84). Managers everywhere strive to minimize transaction
costs and protect their firms against opportunism, although the costs of governance and consequent
choice of governance structure may vary across different economies. 
 In Japanese corp rate networks, firms are often referred to in familial terms. The core company is1
referred to as the oya-gaisha, or parent company. Majority owned subsidiaries are called kogaisha,
or child companies. Even corporate behavior is described in familial terms: for example, core
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Though in the literature on organizations this debate tends to be framed as a dispute between
organization theorists and transaction cost economists, the same debate emerges in all comparative
research: can one take theories derived in one context (usually western) and apply them to all
situations, or, must one look at each case individually, independent of preconceived, western notions?
In this paper, I combine both approaches: the idiographic, cultu e specific approach of embeddedness
with the more generalizable theoretical insights of transaction cost economics. I argue that transaction
cost economics offers a useful framework through which to understand interfirm exchange—provided
that we carefully shape the assumptions of the theory itself to reflect the social, cultural, and
institutional realities in which that exchange is embedded.
I examine an organization form that has long posed a puzzle to researchers: networks of Japanes
automakers and their suppliers. In the substantial literature on these networks, scholars have
attributed the ability of Japanese utomakers to manage close, collaborative, long-term relationships
with a handful of highly dedicated suppliers to both factors unique to Japan and more universal
theory. This paper addresses one means by which automakers and their suppliers manage economic
exchange—automaker equity stakes in suppliers. I refer to these links throughout this paper as
"equity ties" from automaker to supplier. These equity ties are a product of a complex interaction
between embeddedness and economics. While their meaning is highly symbolic, their role is consistent
with a transaction cost framework. 
We cannot understand the significance of equity stakes in Japan solely through theory rooted in the
Anglo-American system of corporate governance. In Japan, equity is a symbol of affiliation and
obligation. An automaker's equity stake in a supplier is a very public statement that a supplier is part
of the automaker's group—its business family. An automaker has an obligation to keep members of1
companies will often describe their treatment of suppliers as ama —a term usually reserved to
describe a mother's indulgence of her children. 
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this family from economic harm.While this obligation is not stipulated by law, there is evidence that
it is supported by very real sanctions. Even when sanctions do not exist, there is a strong sense among
Japanese managers that such behavior towards closely affiliated suppliers is expected—taken for
granted. 
 The symbolic significance of equity does not mean that it defies economic interpretation. The
obligation represented by an automaker's equity stake in a supplier means that equity can serve as a
credible commitment—and as a governance structure quite consistent with the predictions of
transaction cost economics. A supplier whose shares are held by an automaker is assured that its
customer will not behave opportunistically, and that it is safe to invest in relationship-specific assets.
Thus, the web of equity ties extending from automaker to supplier, and the serious obligations
symbolized by these ties, has encouraged and enabled parts suppliers to make the investments in
relationship-specific assets that have been deemed so important to the success of Japanese auto
supply networks (Dyer, 1996). 
Once we understand transaction cost economics and embeddedness as complementary rather than as
competing poles of a debate, another debate, this time, concerning the management of
interorganizational networks, comes into focus. The view of automakers' equity stakes in suppliers
that I have proposed above—of equity stakes as symbols of affiliation, of automaker obligation to
keep suppliers alive and healthy—suggests that supplier networks are governed by a logic of mutual
commitment. An automaker publicly commits to a supplier's survival, and that supplier commits
relationship-specific assets to that automaker. 
This logic of commitment stands in contrast to a logic of control that is often seen in analyses of
6interorganizational linkage. In organization theory, the dominant representative of this logic of control
is resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978)—in which firms link with others to
manage their dependence and stabilize transactions in an uncertain world. In research on Japanes
supply networks, the dominant representative of this logic of contro is the dual economy perspective,
in which large manufacturers hold their suppliers' shares to control and exploit them. Although
different in many respects, these theories share an assumption that the decision to link with another
firm is unilateral—action that one firm takes strategically to manage an unfavorable position and
maximize its power vis a vis another. 
The notion of governance through embedded ties, through symbols of obligation from buyer to
supplier which allow a supplier to invest in specific investments, offers a very different perspective
on networks. This perspective is consistent with other research on Japanese interfirm networks, which
finds that networks of larger firms (kigyo hudan) are permeated by a sense of community, and strong
norms of redistributing wealth from the rich to the poor of the group (Lincoln, Gerlach, and
Ahmadjian, 1996). This perspective is also consistent with accounts of Japanese auto parts supply
networks which find high levels of collaboration and cooperation between automakers and their
suppliers (Nishiguchi, 1994; Smitka, 1991). 
The first section of this paper presents an overview of the structure of supply relations in Japan. The
second section addresses the role of equity as a symbolof com itment in Japan, based both upon my
own interviews with Japanese managers and an overview of the literature on cross-shareholding and
corporate performance in Japan. In the following section, I derive a number of hypotheses addressing
the role of equity as a credible commitment as well as competing hypotheses based upon resource
dependence and dual economy perspectives. The analysis section presents tests of these hypotheses
on a sample consisting of Japan's 11 automakers and 237 suppliers. I conclude with some questions
to be addressed in the future—in particular regarding the circumstances under which automakers have
7purchased shares in their suppliers. 
SUPPLY RELATIONS IN THE JAPANESE AUTO INDUSTRY
In the mid-1980's, as Japan's global dominance of the automobile industry seemed assured, the
purchasing practices of large Japanese managers began to attract the attention of foreign scholars and
managers. Observers of the industry reported that he vaunted ability of Japanese firms to respond
rapidly to shifts in market demand and endure seemingly endless rounds of cost-cutting stemmed in
part from a set of innovative purchasing practices. Curiously, these practices sounded like a case
study from an American textbook on how not to conduct busi ess. While theories of management
popular in the West cautioned firms to avoid dependence upon suppliers and customers through
spreading their business across numerous business partners or through vertical integration
(Williamson, 1985; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), Japanese automakers contracted out for a larg
percentage of their parts, depended upon a limited number of suppliers, signed incomplete contracts,
and provided suppliers with sensitive information on their business plans and operations (Helper,
1990). Suppliers, too, often relied heavily upon a single customer, committed resources to their
customers even before signing a contract, and disclosed crucial information on their cost structures.
At first, thes networks were dismissed as a system by which large firms exploited the small, an
undesirable product of Japan's late economic development, which left a thin layer of large,
technologically sophisticated manufacturers atop a vast majority of small, backward suppliers
(Watanabe, 1985; van Wolferen, 1989). By the 1980's, however, it had become difficult to dismiss
these purchasing practices so easily. Analyses of the auto industry identified a distinct set of
purchasing practices that allowed Japanese automakers to achieve the flexibility and cost-
competitiveness that brought them to the forefront of the global economy.
One of the most striking contrasts between Japanese automakers and their American competitors is
8reliance upon a limited number of suppliers. While the average U.S. automaker might contract
directly with 10,000 suppliers (Dyer and Ouchi, 1993), the average Japanese automaker numbers its
direct, or first tier, suppliers in the hundreds. These first tier suppliers control their own set of direct,
second tier suppliers who in turn control third tier suppliers. Consequently, a typical Japanese
automaker is at the apex of a pyramid of tens of thousands of  suppliers (Aoki, 1988). 
Japanese and U.S. automakers differ as well in their management of direct suppliers. In Japan,
cooperation begins in the earliest stages of new model development. While Japanese automakers
claim to choose suppliers based upon competitive bids, relationships between automakers and
suppliers tend to be stable and long-lived. Automobile manufacturers responding to a 1993 survey
by the Japan Fair Trade Commission reported that on average, 91.7% of their top 30 suppliers had
been doing business with them for over 30 years (Japan FTC, 1993: 24). Cooperation between
automaker and supplier continues throughout the manufacturing process, with a constant search for
cost-reducing redesigns and improvements through value analysis and value engineering (Nishiguchi,
1994; Asanuma, 1989). 
Suppliers in Japan have a strong incentive to continuously reduce cost . The written contract contains
no fixed prices; rather, twice a year, an automaker announces general pri  reduction targets and then
renegotiates prices with each parts maker individually. A supplier that is able to reduce its costs
significantly below the price without compromising quality can pocket the difference—at least until
the next round of price negotiations (Asanuma, 1989). If it cannot meet its target, a supplier may lose
preferred status or even be required to submit to reorganization. 
Despite the high dependence of suppliers upon specific automakers, and automakers upon specific
suppliers, "governance structures" in a western sense, appear to be few. Contracts are vague—general
guidelines for an ongoing relationship, rather than stipulations of prices and quantities and what to
do under specific contingencies (Asanuma, 1989). Automakers very rarely own controlling stakes in
9their suppliers—while they often own suppliers' shares, these positions tend to be relatively small.
Researchers have proposed a gr at number of explanations of the ability for supplier and automaker
to avoid rampant opportunism and manage cooperative relationships without resorting to contingent
contracts or vertical integration, ranging from the purely cultural to the purely economic, to
something in between. Cooperatin be ween automakers and suppliers has been attributed variously
to Confucian influence in Japanese culture (Dore, 1983), to mutual self-interest (Nishiguchi, 1994),
to carefully crafted trust-enhancing institutions such as supplier associations (Smitka, 1991), to an
incentive system consistent with agency theory (Asanuma and Kikutani, 1992), to an effective system
of corporate governance through cross-shareholding (Gilson and Roe, 1993), and to the ability of
automakers to take advantage of an imbalance of power to force suppliers to cooperat  (Arita, 1985).
The truth lies in a combination of all of the above. Any purchasing manager, shuttling back and forth
between golf games, end-of-year parties, and other social events with suppliers will attest to the
personal nature of these relationships. The success of a number of Japanese aut  p rts suppliers (most
prominently, Nippondenso), supports the noion that these relationships are in the best interest of (at
least certain) suppliers as well as the automakers. The effort that automakers and suppliers put into
maintaining the web of cross-shareholding and directorate interlocks—and the great attention the
business press pays to cases in which these ties are reduced or severed—suggests that these linkages
also play an important role in governance.
We could leave it at that—that a dense and complex web of formal and informal ties link automakers
to their suppliers and thus these relationships are not reducible to a single governance structure. Yet
there are a number of reasons why applying a microscope to a single type of tie, equity, is useful.
First, to truly understand embeddedness—how social relati nships, cultural context, and institutional
environment interact with economic exchange—it is useful to identify a single example of such an
interaction, and in Japan, equity, with its symbolic, as well as economic significance, is a particularly
 Automakers hold shares in suppliers with which they do busin ss—instances in which an automaker2
holds shares of a supplier with which it does no business, merely for the purpose of investment, are
rare if not non-existent.
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good choice. Second, there is evidence that equity ties are particularly prevalent and important, not
only in auto parts supply networks, but across the Japanese economy. A 1993 survey by the Japan
Fair Trade Commission found that automakers held shares in almost 60% of their top thirty suppliers
(ranked by volume) (Japan FTC, 1993: 27). Automaker equity stakes in suppliers fit into a larger 2
pattern of institutional shareholding in Japan as well. Cross-shareholding links buyers and sellers of
industrial products and raw materials as well as diverse firms in both related and unrelated
industries—to the extent that in 1991, nonfinancial companies held 25.1% of shares of all listed
companies (Teranishi, 1994: 48).
Further evidence of the importance of equity ties in the Japanese economy is apparent in research
relating shareholding to firm performance. Firms linked to large business groups—the bank-centered
groups (kigyo shudan) of Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sanwa, Fuyo, and DKB—recover more
quickly than independents from financial distress (Hoshi, Kashyap & Scharfstein, 1990) and do so
at the expense of higher performing members of these groups (Lincoln, Gerlach & Ahmadjian,
1996). Shareholders often send new management to troubled firms (Kaplan, 1991; Kang and
Shivdasani, 1995). They may also infuse cash by purchasing shares held by a troubled firm (Sheard,
1991).
My discussions with Japanese purchasing managers, as well as a review of published company
histories and accounts of rescues of suppliers in the business press, all suggest that automakers (and
large manufacturers in other industries) perceive a similar obligation to assist troubled suppliers.
Managers described the ends to which they went to help suppliers—from sending their own
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managers to carry parts from a supplier too troubled to manage its own transportation and
inventory system, to sending completely new production lines to suppliers that had lost business
when an automaker moved production offshore. Examples of bailouts of suppliers by automakers
often appear in the press. In 1993, for example, Toyota Motors arranged for itself and other
members of the Toyota group to purchase shares held by Toyota Machine Works, an affiliate facing
financial difficulties (Nikkei, 1993). 
Managers of automakers were quite clear that they perceived an obligation to assist certain
suppliers in times of crisis. In interviews, they often began describing obligations towards suppliers
in terms of Japanese business ethics: "As a foreigner, you may find this hard to understand, but as
Japanese, this is our duty..." Respondents also offered examples of concrete sanctions, suggesting
that more than goodwill was at stake. They recounted stories of labor unions picketing companies
believed to have treated affiliates badly and suggested that the mass media was constantly on the
lookout for scandalous stories of heartless large corporations hurting small, defenseless suppliers.
Some managers suggested subtle state pressure as well—one told me that mistreatment of suppliers
might bring extra scrutiny by officials at tax time. Even without direct pressure, the state has a
number of indirect tools to keep companies behaving appropriately, including allocation of export
quotas (Schaede, 1995) and access to subsidies for troubled industries (Tilton, 1996).
Managers I interviewed were extremely hesitant to link such responsibilities to shareholding. Many
insisted that their firms gave no preference whatsoever to suppliers linked to them by equity, that
they were not even aware of which suppliers' shares they held, and that their firms purchased shares
in suppliers many years ago for reasons unrelated to their present trading relationship. These
managers seemed, however, a bit too adamant about denying a role to equity—perhaps due to
discomfort in discussing these issues with an American researcher at a time when trade tensions over
auto parts were high and automaker shareholding of suppliers was an issue in trade negotiations.
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Despite their insistence otherwise, there is reason to believe that equity ties to suppliers are
particularly salient to these managers, and do bring a strong sense of obligation. Shareholding is
one of the most public, and readily available measures of affiliation between firms. A small industry
in Japan is devoted to publishing books and directories that identify equity links (called keiretsu ties
in Japanese) between firms. Information on these links are readily available for all listed firms, and
for many unlisted firms as well. Newspaper articles about a firm often identify its main keiretsu, or
equity affiliation—such as "Tanaka Auto Parts, member of the Toyota keiretsu, announced an early
retirement plan yesterday."
Further evidence of the significance of an equity stake is the eagerness of suppliers for their
customers to purchase their shares, to make public their commitment (Ballon and Tomita, 1988).
Purchasing managers of large manufacturers told me that their companies were often hesitant to
purchase suppliers' shares—such a public affiliation was not something to be entered into lightly.
A relationship between automaker equity stakes and supplier performance shows up statistically as
well. In a study of performance of 125 auto parts suppliers during the 1980's and early 1990's,
Ahmadjian (1997) finds that suppliers whose shares are held by automakers tend to recover more
quickly from economic distress, and in certain cases—such as suppliers of Toyota—do not encounter
distress in the first place. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Equity as a credible commitment 
Shareholding in Japan represents more than a legal arrangement. An equity tie between an
automaker and a supplier symbolizes a commitment—an obligation for an automaker to
protect the supplier in times of trouble (and to keep it out of trouble in the first place). This
obligation is supported by informal, but no less powerful, social, political, and economic
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institutions particular to Japan. Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton (1991: 387) write: 
"Asian firms, like all firms, operate in an institutional environment that presents a
structure of constraints and possibilities, but, most importantly, of normative forms of
economic action. Each of these economies, our data suggest, fashions itself after a
distinctive institutional environment, generating a characteristic pattern of business
relationships. These relationships are not simply ones of convenience or efficiency, but
represent enactments of socially acceptable, institutionalized forms of economic
behavior–they are the manifestations of a normative structure that underlies economic
activity and provides market order.."
In Japan this normative structure involves obligation—of strong firms to weak, of customers
to suppliers. Yet this obligation does not exist among all firms, but rather between firms that
are publicly associated with the same "group."  Perhaps the most public way of defining a
group relationship is by equity. 
Understanding equity as a commitment, rather than a means for one firm to establish control,
influence, or monitoring over another, requires us to depart from a U.S.-centered view of
equity. This does not, however, mean a complete departure from theory. Equity ties, as they
function in Japan, play a role remarkably consistent with the notion of credible commitments,
as set out in transaction cost economics. In the transaction cost framework, a credible
commitment is an assurance that a party to a transaction will not behave opportunistically
once another has invested in dedicated assets. Such commitments often take the form of
hostages—investments that a party to the transaction will forfeit if it behaves opportunistically
(Williamson, 1985). But an equity stake in Japan is more than a sum that will be lost if a
supplier to performs poorly or goes out of business. Rather, it represents an obligation that
that automaker will not suddenly sever the relationship, and will try to keep the supplier
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healthy.
Although the notion of credible commitment is not exclusive to transaction cost economics,
transaction cost economics has made this concept particularly applicable to Japanese supply
relations by wedding it to asset specificity. According to transaction cost economics, a credible
commitment is one of a range of governance structures that protect a firm that has made
transaction-specific investments in assets ranging from specific sites, physical equipment,
dedicated capacity, and knowledge and skills (Williamson, 1985). Such specific investments are
hazardous due to the "fundamental transformation"—in the case of an auto parts supplier,
the change in bargaining position once it has made investments specific to a single automaker.
Students of Japanese automobile supply networks argue that Japanese auto parts suppliers
make particularly high levels of customer-specific investments. Auto parts tend to be highly
customized to specific automakers and models, and as a result, necessitate considerable
investment in non-redeployable assets (Dyer, 1995; Nishiguchi, 1994). Investment in customer-
specific sites is common—as seen in the concentration of Toyota suppliers in Toyota City and
its immediate environs. Japanese auto parts suppliers also make considerable investments in
specific human capital. Guest engineers, dispatched by suppliers to an automaker's facilities,
learn everything from how it manages the development process to the shorthand it uses for
notes on its drawings (Asanuma, 1989). Suppliers develop informal networks with an
automaker's managers and engineers, to obtain information and get things done (Liker et al.,
1995).
An automaker is willing to make a costly equity investment in a supplier as a credible
commitment because supplier specialization enhances its own performance. This high degree
of supplier specialization facilitates information exchange and learning (Dyer, 1996) and has
helped Japanese automakers to make drastic reductions in costs and development time, while
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keeping quality high. The need to manage only a small handful of highly dedicated suppliers
allows automakers efficiencies of coordination and control (Nishiguchi, 1994).
Automakers also make investments dedicated to their suppliers. High customization of parts
and low inventories due to the just-in-time system makes it difficult to change suppliers in
midstream. Yet there is reason to believe that specific investments weigh more heavily on
suppliers than on automakers. Automakers are far larger than suppliers—for example,
Nippondenso, the largest auto parts supplier in Japan has only about one-fifth of the assets of
its main customer, Toyota. Most suppliers, even first tier suppliers, are smaller. First tier
suppliers vary greatly in size: while about 25% of first-tier suppliers of an average automaker
have over 1000 employees, nearly half have fewer than 300 (Japan FTC, 1993: p. 7). While the
loss of a supplier may be disruptive for an automaker, it can be devastating for a supplier.
Measuring specific investments has been a challenge to researchers in transaction cost
economics. Some have addressed this problem through finely detailed interview or survey data
(Walker and Poppo, 1991). Others have used general measures likely to relate to specific
investments, such as development time and R&D intensity (Monteverde and Teece, 1982;
Pisano, 1989). In this study, I use a combination of measures—both fine-grained measures
such as the difficulty of manufacture of each part as well as broader measures such as firm size
and the degree of dependence of one firm on another for purchases or sales of parts. The entire
pattern of results, across a number of measures, provides a more reliable picture of patterns
of governance in the industry than single measures taken in isolation. 
Although Williamson (1985: 308) warns that “the mere fact that one firm does a considerable
amount of business with another...does not establish that specific assets have thereby been
exposed,” there is reason to believe that volume dependence is related to asset specificity in the
Japanese industry. A supplier that sells a large percentage of its output to a single customer
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is likely to have added production capacity in the understanding that its relationship will be
ongoing. It is likely to have made investments in dedicated human assets—in deploying
engineers to the automaker and in developing informal communication networks with its
employees. Even if it has not made large investments in specific assets, it is unlikely to be able
to replace quickly lost business. Typically, an automaker initiates a relationship with a new
supplier only very slowly, with small orders at first, until it is assured that this supplier is
reliable (Smitka, 1991). A supplier will be willing to limit relationships with other automakers
and increase dependence on a single customer if that customer has made a commitment that
it will not sever the relationship. 
H1: The larger the percentage of its total output that a supplier sells to an automaker, the more likely
that automaker is to hold that supplier’s shares.
Another measure of the degree to which a supplier has made customer-specific investments is the
number of different parts a supplier sells to that customer.  A supplier that sells only one part to an
automaker is likely to know the purchasing agents and engineers who deal with that part very well.
A supplier that sells many parts will be much more widely integrate  into he utomaker through both
formal and informal relationships. Moreover, given that relationships are built over time, with an
automaker making small orders at first, a supplier that sells many parts to an automaker is likely to
have spent many years developing this relationship, and investing in customer-specific human and
physical capital. 
H2: The more parts a supplier sells to an automaker, the more likely that automaker is to hold that
supplier’s shares. 
The smaller the supplier, the more hazardous opportunistic behavior on the part of an automaker is
likely to be. The Japanese economy is highly stratified by firm size (Clark, 1979) and larger firms have
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greater access to capital and to quality employees. Larger suppliers have considerable technological
expertise and marketing savvy. Larger suppliers, for example, were quit  proactive in moving into
the US market to supply US automakers and Japanese transplants, often moving before their main
Japanese customer had developed production facilities (Martin, Mitchell, and Swaminathan, 1995).
A larger supplier is thus better able to diversify its customer base in the event that a customer
threatens to sever its relationship. Smaller suppliers, with fewer alternatives, wi l be mor  likely to
require credible commitments before making specific investments. 
H3: The smaller a supplier, the more likely an automaker is to hold its shares. 
The degree of specific investments is likely to differ across characteristics of the part. Parts that are
more difficult to manufacture, due to complexity, specialized skills, and stringent specifications,
require a greater level of specific investment on the part of suppliers, in equipment as well as
customer-specific skills and relationships (Nishiguchi, 1994).
H4: The more difficult a part to manufacture, the more likely that an automaker holds shares of a
supplier of that part. 
There is also evidence that the degree to which automakers and suppliers make specific investments
varies by automaker. Toyota, in p rticular, has been identified as most likely to have suppliers make
specific investments. Toyota is more likely than other automakers to exchange engineers with
suppliers (Liker et al., 1995) and was the first to introduce sophisticated manufacturing and control
techniques to its suppliers (Lieberman, Demeester, and Rivas, 1995). While some manufacturers trail
closely after Toyota, e.g. Nissan, in the adoption of such practices, others seem to involve their
suppliers very little. (A purchasing manager of a smaller automaker said to me: “We never send
engineers to suppliers. We give them drawings, they submit parts to us, and that’s that.”)
H5: Toyota is more likely than other automakers to hold shares of its suppliers. 
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Equity ties as a means of control
I have argued above that equity serves as a credible commitment from buyer to supplier—as
an assurance that the buyer will not take advantage of a supplier that has made investments
in specific assets. This perspective diverges from western organization theory in that it
considers equity as having a symbolic role—embedded in the cultural, social, and institutional
context of the Japanese economy.
This view of a buyer using equity as a credible commitment to a supplier also diverges from
an alternative perspective on Japanese buyer-supplier relations—one of power and control.
Discussion of power is never far away in the study of Japanese supply networks. The nijyu
kozo, or dual economy framework, provided the dominant outlook on supply relations in Japan
for many years. The view of suppliers as a disadvantaged group, easily susceptible to opportunistic
behavior on the part of automakers dominated both the thinking of Marxist economists and
conservative politicians and bureaucrats. In 1957, the official Economic White Paper described
Japan as a dual economy, and concern about the viability of small firms led to numerous
institutions and laws to assure these firms of preferential access to capital, and prevent
exploitation by large manufacturers  (Arita, 1985).
According to the dual economy perspective, ties of control flow exclusively from buyer to supplier.
There is some empirical evidence supporting this. In their analysis of linkages between 250 large
firms, Lincoln, Gerlach, and Takahashi (1992) find that while reciprocal holdings are common
among larger firms, the degree of reciprocity decreases when smaller firms are involved. 
H6: Equity ties extend from automaker to supplier; not in the other direction. 
Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) is another theoretical perspective that
takes into account dynamics of power and dependence and has implications for equity linkages
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between automakers and suppliers. According to this perspective, organizations manage
dependence through a variety of strategies. While Japanese-style equity positions have not been
considered in this context, they may be means to manage dependence. If large enough, a
shareholding stake enables an automaker to influence a supplier’s behavior. Even smaller stakes
are often accompanied by dispatch of directors (Lincoln, Gerlach, and Takahashi, 1992) who can
bring to a supplier personal influence. Suppliers may use this strategy as well—holding shares
in an automaker to minimize dependence, or requesting an automaker to purchase its shares and
dispatch directors as a means of co-optation.
According to resource dependence theory, an organization is dependent upon another to the
extent that a part is critical, a supplier has discretion, and the buyer has few other alternatives.
A relationship in which an automaker purchases a large percentage of its inputs of a part from
a supplier is a particularly critical one; if such a supplier demands higher prices, the automaker
has little choice but to agree. With inventories cut to a bare minimum in the just-in-time
production system, the loss of a supplier can be disastrous—even if many suppliers of similar
parts exist.
H7: The larger of a percentage of its total purchases of a part that an automaker purchases from
a supplier, the more likely that automaker will hold that supplier’s shares. 
If equity links from automaker to supplier manage dependencies, these ties will be especially
prevalent in cases in which an automaker has few other alternatives.  Conversely, they should be
less frequent when an automaker has other alternatives. If an automaker is able to manufacture
a part in-house, it can make a credible threat that it will withdraw its orders. Automakers able to
produce a part in-house are less dependent upon suppliers and do not need to hold their shares.
H8: An automaker that produces a part internally is less likely to hold shares in a supplier of that
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part.
An automaker is also less likely to need to reduce dependence on parts for which there are many
alternative suppliers. Research on resource dependence has paid particular attention to market
concentration, a measure of the existence of alternatives, as a condition that increases
dependence (Burt, 1983). This is a point upon which resource dependence and transaction cost
economics differ. According to transaction cost economics, the actual number and concentration
of suppliers does not matter, since the important issue is the degree of specific asset investments.
H9:  The more suppliers that sell a part, the less likely an automaker will hold shares of a
supplier of that part. 
Equity ties and history
Equity links between automaker and supplier may be related to particular historical circumstances.
In the early years of the auto industry, auto parts suppliers were not particularly sophisticated; if an
automaker was to have viable suppliers it had to invest in developing them. Apprehension about the
future of the auto industry and labor unrest in the early post-war years made automakers hesitant to
develop capabilities internally, and gave them more incentive to either invest in, or establish,
independent suppliers (Cusumano, 1989; Odaka, Ono, and Adachi, 1988). In the 1960’s, another
wave of investment by automakers in suppliers occurred, as suppliers asked automakers to hold their
shares and protect them from takeover as Japanese financial markets were opened to foreign firms
(Ballon and Tomita, 1988). 
If equity linkages are remnants of a particular historical period, we should expect them to be limited
to firms that existed, or at least were well-established, during this period. Later entrants into the auto
industry, such as Honda and Mitsubishi Motors, will be less likely to hold shares in suppliers than
earlier entrants such as Nissan and Toyota. 
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H10: Early entrants to the auto industry are more likely to hold shares in their suppliers. 
Another circumstance under which an automaker holds shares in a supplier is when the supplier is a
spun-off division. This process of spin-off, in which a firm sets up a division as an independent firm,
is quite prevalent in the Japanese economy, and has increased over time (Ito, 1995). A number of
prominent suppliers, in particular Nippondenso, are spun-off divisions of automakers. An parent
company tends to maintain equity in its spin-offs, although it gradually decreases the size of its stake
over time. If this is the case, we should expect to see newer suppliers with equity ties to automakers,
as these represent the most recent spin-offs. 
H11: Automakers are more likely to hold shares of younger suppliers (suppliers with later founding
dates). 
An automaker may also take an equity position in a troubled supplier to provide it with capital—and
that equity tie may remain even after the financial crisis eases. These ncidents tend to be firm specific,
and depend upon the policies of each individual company towards bailouts. In this case, we should
expect o see quite a bit of variation in patterns of shareholding among automakers, that cannot be
explained by such systematic measures as firm size, founding date, and transaction characteristics. 
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DATA AND METHODS
The data set draws from a number of sources. Data on parts come from  Jidosha Buhin no 160
Hinmei no Seisan Ryutsu Chosa (A survey of manufacture and distribution of 160 auto parts)
published in 1987 by IRC, a private purveyor of business information (1987). This report lists first
tier suppliers of each of the 11 Japanese auto manufacturers for 160 automobile parts. This source
includes the name of each supplier as well as the volume provided to each auto manufacturer. Thirty
parts were omitted from the final sample—either because they were used for only a limited number
of models or by a limited number of automakers, or because information on the difficulty of
manufacture was unavailable.
Data on suppliers and automakers, including assets, founding data, and composition of
shareholders were obtained from the 1989 volumes (containing firm data for 1987) of Kaisha
Nenkan and Kaisha Sokan, annual corporate reports for firms listed on any Japanese stock
exchange and approximately 10,000 unlisted firms, respectively. These volumes are published
annually by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun-sha, a leading publisher Japanese economic data. Data on
unlisted firms not included in these volumes were obtained from Kaisha Soran, a directory published
by Diamond (1989).
In total, 455 firms supplied these 130 parts. I was able to obtain data for virtually all of the 131
listed suppliers. Of the 324 unlisted firms, data for only 106 were available. The data set covers
74% of the transactions involving these customers, suppliers, and parts, although it only covers 50%
of all suppliers involved. Despite incomplete coverage of unlisted firms, inclusion of a limited
number of unlisted firms has some advantages. Since unlisted firms tend to be smaller, it enables
inclusion of many small firms. This is important in analyses of supply networks, where the issue of
how automakers treat their smallest suppliers is especially controversial.
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Because the primary objective of this paper is to examine how equity links vary with the
characteristics of the transactions, incomplete coverage of unlisted suppliers is unlikely to introduce
bias into the analyses, especially for such variables as supplier dependence, degree of
manufacturing difficulty of the part, and number of alternative sources for the part. Caution is
warranted, however, in the analysis of automakers’ propensities to hold supplier shares. I address
this issue further in the analysis and discussion section.
I supplemented the data with open-ended interviews with managers of 7 automakers and parts
suppliers as well as numerous interviews with managers of suppliers and manufacturers in the
electronics industry. 
Model and estimation procedures 
The unit of analysis is the automaker-supplier dyad. These dyads do not represent all combinations
of automakers and suppliers, but rather all automakers and suppliers that actually do business, for a
total of 984 dyads. Because the research question is: "Given the presence of a trading tie, what
characteristics of the supplier, the automaker, and the part make an equity link more likely?" a sample
of only dyads in which a purchasing transaction exists is appropriate. All transactions examined are
external since the research question is not “Why do firms organize some transactions internally and
some externally?” but rather, “Given that a firm organizes a transaction extern lly, how does it govern
this transaction?”
The model is based on one developed by Lincoln (1984), and used by Lincoln, Gerlach and Takahashi

















The dependent variable is the percent of supplier shares held by an automaker. This is the number of
supplier shares held by the automaker divided by the total number of shares outstanding and is
entered into models as either a dichotomous or continuous measure. Kaisha Nenkan, the source of
shareholding data for listed firms, reports only the top 10 shareholders. If an automaker is the 11th
shareholder, its shareholding position is listed as 0. For unlisted suppliers, the data comes from
Kaisha Sokan, where the requirements for reporting shareholders are a vague “top shareholders,”
and usually fewer than 10 shareholders are listed. As a consequence, the prevalence of automaker
shareholding of suppliers is likely to be underreported. However, since shareholding is a public
statement of commitment, and the top 10 shareholders names are the ones that are the most publicly
accessible, using the top 10 shareholders, those publicly reported, is appropriate. 
In most of the analyses presented here, the dependent variable is automaker equity share in a
25
supplier. Information on ties extended in this direction is available for both unlisted and listed firms.
Data on supplier shareholding of automakers are available for listed firms only.
Independent variables
Volume dependence PCTSU is the percentage of an automaker's purchases of a part from a
supplier, averaged over all parts that automaker purchases from that supplier. If automaker
j purchases 50% of its inputs of part x from supplier i, and 40% of its inputs of part y from
supplier i, this measure takes the value of 45%.  A similar measure, PCTCU, was constructed
for supplier dependence on each automaker.
Number of suppliers per part This represents the existence of alternative suppliers for a part.
It is the number of suppliers per part, averaged over all parts that automaker j purchases from
supplier i. If a supplier sells an automaker part x and part y, and there are a total of 2
suppliers of part x in the market, and 4 suppliers of part y, this takes the value of 3.
Extent of internal production This is the percentage of its inputs of a part manufactured by
automaker j internally, averaged over all parts that automaker j purchases from supplier i. 
Total number of parts supplied by supplier i This is the total number of different kinds of parts
that supplier i sells to automaker j. 
Difficulty of manufacture Difficulty of manufacture of a part ranges from 1=very simple to
3=very difficult. It is averaged over all of the parts that supplier i sells to automaker j. Parts
that are difficult to manufacture are complex, require high levels of skill, and have very
stringent specifications (i.e. tight tolerances). I requested three engineers, who were responsible
for parts procurement for three Japanese transplants in the U.S, to evaluate the difficulty of
manufacture of a list of parts. Each engineer evaluated the parts with which he had the most
experience.
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Other variables Other independent variables include year of founding of supplier and
automaker, total assets of supplier and automaker, whether a supplier is listed on the stock
exchange or not, and a set of dummy variables for automaker and parts system.
FINDINGS 
Table 1 presents an overview of differences between automak rs in patterns of transactions. It shows
that automakers have varying p opensities to hold shares of suppliers. It also highlights variations in
propensity to manufacture parts internally and dependence upon suppliers. 
Equity as credible commitment 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for selected variables. Table 3 reports models
explaining the effects of various characteristics of automakers, suppliers, and transactions on the
existence of an equity tie from automaker to supplier. The model in column 3 includes dummies for
automakers, while the model in column 4 includes dummies for parts subsystems.
The results presented in Table 3 support the proposition that equity ties are a credible commitment
from automaker to supplier. I argued that in Japan, dependence of a supplier on an automaker for
purchases is related to customer-specific investments. A supplier that supplies a number of different
parts to an automaker is also more likely to have made specific investments—in physical equipment
as well as specific knowledge and informal relationships with an automaker's engineers and managers.
Likewise, more difficult to manufacture parts require higher levels of specific investments. 
Hypotheses concerning all of these variables are supported.  The larger the percentage of its output
a supplier offers to an automaker, the more types of parts it sells to an automaker, and the more
difficult its parts to manufacture, the more likely that automaker holds the supplier’s shares.
Automakers are also more likely to hold shares in their smaller suppliers, as posited by Hypothesis
3. Smaller suppliers are more liable to be adversely affected by an automaker’s opportunism, and thus
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more likely to require a commitment. 
Column 4 of Table 3 examines the relationship between various parts systems and automaker equity
links to suppliers. This model includes dummy variables for five parts systems (the omitted categories
are wheels, suspension, body parts, and miscellaneous parts). Automakers are more likely to hold
shares in suppliers of transmission and steeri g parts and less likely to hold shares of makers of body
parts, wheels, and miscellaneous parts including air conditioners, clocks, and radios. Parts system is
not correlated with manufacturing difficulty and seems to measure an unknown dimension of the
transaction that requires further examination. It is interesting to note that automakers are not
significantly more likely to hold shares in suppliers of engine parts, although engine parts require
perhaps the highest level of cooperation and interaction b tween automaker and supplier of all the
systems. If cooperation is related to asset specific investments, these results suggest a curvilinear
relationship between asset specificity and governance, in which equity helps to govern transactions
involving moderate levels of specific investment.
Column 3 of Table 3 examines variation among automakers. The model includes dummy variables
for six automakers: Toyota, Nissan, Mitsubishi Motors, Honda, Mazda, and Isuzu. Five firms,
Suzuki, Nissan Diesel, Fuji, Hino, and Daihatsu were omitted due to problems with multicollinearity.
Toyota and Nissan are most likely to hold equity in their suppliers, which is expected if suppliers of
Toyota and Nissan are most likely to make specific investments. An alternative interpretation of this
result is firm size. The log of automaker assets is positively and significantly related to the likelihood
of an equity link to a supplier. The fit of the model does not improve when dummy variables for
automakers are substituted for a continuous measure of automaker assets, suggesting that firm
dummies and assets capture the same effects. 
Why are larger automakers more likely to hold equity in their suppliers? A smple answer is that larger
automakers  have deeper pockets and more capital to invest. Alternatively, the relationship between
 I also conducted analyses separately for each customer. I  found that the while propensity to hold3
shares in suppliers differed by autom ker, the basic relationships, between volume dependence, size,
and manufacturing  difficulty varied in intensity but not direction.  
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automaker size and equity investment in suppliers may be the result of reverse causality. If
automakers hold shares in suppliers that have made specific investments, and specific investments by
their suppliers lead to higher economic returns for a tomakers, those firms which purchased supplier
shares in order to encourage them to make specific investments may have been more successful and
grown faster than those that did not. Another explanation involves power and exploitation: if
automakers use equity shares in suppliers to extract excess rents, automakers who have these links
may have been able to grow faster.3
There is also a possibility that the relationship between size and equity is an artifact of the sample. Smaller automakers may hold shares of very small, unlisted suppliers,
for which data on shareholder composition were not available. Alternatively, they may hold small positions that do not appear among the top 10 in larger suppliers. Yet
percentage of missing suppliers does not appear to be highly correlated with number of equity ties to suppliers. Mitsubishi, for example, is more likely than Suzuki,
Daihatsu, Fuji, Nissan Diesel, or Hino to hold supplier shares, even though many Mitsubishi suppliers are missing from the data set. Although a high percentage of Isuzu
suppliers are included, Isuzu holds shares of far fewer suppliers than Toyota or Nissan. When the sample is limited to listed firms, for which no suppliers are missing,
the estimates of propensity to hold supplier shares are virtually the same as estimates for the entire sample.
Equity as symbol  
Table 4 presents models in which an equity tie from automaker to supplier is measured as a
continuous variable. These results lend further support to the notion of equity as a symbolic
commitment. The first column presents a tobit regression of continuous ties from automaker t
supplier for all automaker-supplier dyads. The second column presents ordinary least squares analysis
of continuous equity ties from automakers to suppliers, for dyads in which an equity tie exists. This
model addresses the question: “Given the existence of an equity tie, how much does the actual
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intensity of the tie matter?” 
In the OLS analysis, many of the significant effects disappear. Number of parts procured from a
supplier, size of supplier, and difficulty in manufacture all lose significance and strength. The effect
of supplier dependence on an automaker (PCTSU) remains significant, but is quite small. While
selling 100% of its output to an automaker nearly doubles the log odds that an automaker  holds a
supplier’s equity, a move from 1% to 100% reliance of a supplier on an automaker is associated with
an increase in equity stake of only about 0.12. These results show that equity ties from automaker
to supplier are public symbols of affiliation rather than means of control.
Equity and the dual economy 
At first glance, some of the results reported above as supporting a credible commitment interpretation
of equity ties are consistent with a dual economy perspective. An automaker that holds enough of a
supplier’s shares can exert considerable control and require the supplier to sell it a large percentage
of its output—even if the supplier prefers to become more diversified. An automaker that holds a
large stake in a supplier can also use its influence to extract excess returns, and prevent the supplier
in investing in its own growth. As a result, suppliers tied to their customers with equity will be smaller
and more dependent than independent suppliers. 
Table 4 presents counter-evidence. An automaker’s ability to keep a supplier weak and dependent
should increase with the size of its equity stake and its resulting ability to exert control. The results
in Column 2 of Table 4 show that the size of an automaker’s equity stake has no relationship to a
supplier’s size, and only a slight relationship to supplier dependence.  
Equity and resource dependence 
As postulated in Hypothesis 6, the more an automaker purchases from a supplier, the more likely it
is to hold that supplier’s shares. This finding in itself is consistent with resource dependence theory:
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an automaker that depends upon a supplier for inputs of a part will try to manage this dependence
by purchasing its shares. Other results, however, call this interpretation into question. Furthermore,
analyses presented later in this paper indicate a high degree of reciprocity in shareholding when
automakers are dependent upon suppliers—suggesting something other than the unilateral
management of dependence posited by resource dependence theory. 
Further evidence against resource dependence is the finding that, contrary to Hypothesis 8, internal
production capbility does not reduce an automaker’s likelihood of holding supplier shares. In fact,
an automaker is even more likely to hold shares of suppliers of parts that it produces internally. This
lends further support to a credible commitment interpretation. A supplier will be particularly unwilling
to make specific investments in an automaker that can easily internalize production—and requires a
credible commitment that its customer will not suddenly bring all production in house. It is also
possible that parts an automaker manufactures internally require the highest degree of specific
investment; thus, an automaker must make a credible commitment to encourage suppliers of such
parts to make the necessary investments. 
Contrary to predictions based upon resource dependence theory, an automaker is not more likely to
hold shares in suppliers of parts for which there are few alternatives. The number of suppliers of a
part has no relationship to the likelihood of an equity tie from automaker to supplier, in contrast to
Hypothesis 9. This is further evidence of a fundamental transformation to a small numbers bargaining
situation once specific investments are made. Even if there are alternative suppliers, it is not easy for
an automaker or supplier to initiate new relationships. 
Another finding that runs counter to resource dependencetheory is the negative relationship between
supplier size and equity ties. If automakers purchase shares of suppliers to manage dependencies, they
should be most likely to hold shares of their largest, most powerful, suppliers. On the contrary, they
are more likely to hold shares of their smallest supp i rs. Furthermore, we find that small automakers
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are not highly likely to hold equity in large listed suppliers. Resource dependence theory predicts the
opposite—given the dominance of the Japanese auto industry by a few large firms, in particula
Toyota and Nissan, smaller automakers should try to lock in relationships with suppliers through
equity ties.
In the previous section, I argued that the positive relationship between manufacturing difficulty and
the likelihood of an equity tie from automaker to supplier was evidence that equity was a credible
commitment, as manufacturing difficulty was related to specific investment on the part of the supplier.
This finding, however, could also be interpreted through resource dependence theory. A supplier with
superior manufacturing skills controls a resource in the form of knowledge and skill that is valuable
to the automaker. An automaker is highly dependent upon such a supplier since it cannot reproduce
those skills itself, and will consequently hold its shares. 
Analysis of the interaction between supplier assets and manufacturing skill, presented in column 2 of
Table 3 indicates that this is not the case. The effect of difficulty of manufacture on propensity of an
automaker to hold a supplier’s shares decreases the larger the supplier. If a customer held a supplier's
shares to reduce its dependence, we might expect the opposite. Large suppliers with sophisticated
manufacturing skills should pose the biggest danger to an automaker, and thus require a dependence-
minimizing equity tie. 
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Reciprocity 
Table 5 presents models of reciprocal shareholding for listed firms. These findings indicate
considerable reciprocity—in the existence if not the magnitude of equity ties.
The model in column 1 of Table 5 is identicalto column 1 of Table 3. Column 2 adds supplier equity
stake in the automaker as an independent variable. The effect of this added variable is strong and
significant and the fit of the model improves significantly. When this variable is added, however, the
effect of supplier purchases from an automaker (PCTSU) drops to one half of its original size and its
significance disappears. The strength of the effect automaker purchases from supplier (PCTCU) also
drops and the significance disappears. The inclusion of supplier equity tie to automaker hardly affects
coefficients for internal production, difficulty in manufacture, number of parts supplied, and
automaker and supplier size. 
This finding suggests a reciprocal commitment of equity in cases in which a supplier sells a large
percentage of its outputs to an automaker and those in which an automaker purchases a large
percentage of its output from a supplier. This may be because in these cases, both parties make
considerable investments in relationship-specific assets. In the case of parts that are difficult to
manufacture, the supplier is more likely to make relationship-specific investments, and requires a
credible commitment from the automaker rather than a reciprocal commitment of equity.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 present models for equity ties from supplier to automaker. Suppliers are
significantly more likely to hold shares in automakers upon which they are dependent for a large
percentage of their sales, automakers that depend upon them for a large percentage of their
purchases, and automakers to which they sell multiple parts. They are also more likely to hold shares
in an automaker when they are small and the automaker large. Suppliers that supply parts that are
difficult to manufacture or that are produced internally by their customers are not significantly more
likely to hold shares of automakers.
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As in the previous case, adding automaker equity stake in supplier as an independent variable
improves the fit of the model and decreases the effect of supplier dependence. When a supplier is
dependent on an automaker for purchases of its output, it tends to both send and receive equity
ties—evidence that these relationships are managed through cross-shareholding rather than unilateral
equity links extended from the automaker.
While there is considerable reciprocity in automaker-supplier shareholding, the size of supplier equity
stakes in automakers is small. While on average an automaker that holds shares of its suppliers has
a stake of 15.6%, of suppliers that hold automaker shares, the average position is 0.7% Extremely
small coefficients in the tobit analysis of supplier equity positions in automakers provide further
evidence of the small size of supplier shares in their customers.
Effects of history
The effects of year of entrance into the auto industry (in the case of automakers ) or founding (in the
case of suppliers) are weak, though the si ns are in a direction consistent with the hypotheses. Older
automakers are more likely to hold shares of younger suppliers. 
Listed status has a large and significant effect: automakers are much more likely to hold shares of
listed suppliers. This may be because listed suppli rs have more shares available for purchase—many
unlisted suppliers are family owned. It is also a common practice for an utomaker to purchase shares
in a supplier at the time of its listing, as a public demonstration of support—further evidence of the
public, symbolic role of equity. 
DISCUSSION
Equity plays a significant role in the governance of purchasing transactions in the Japanese auto
industry. Automakers hold shares of suppliers that dedicate to them a large percentage of output,
suppliers from which they purchase a large number of parts, suppliers of parts which require a high
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degree of manufacturing skill, and small suppliers. These patterns suggest that equity is a credible
commitment—a public statement that an automaker will not behave opportunistically to a supplier
that has made specific investments.
Credible commitment or co-optation
An alternative interpretation of these result  is co-optation (Selznick, 1949). As discussed elsewhere
in this paper, suppliers are often quite eager for important customers to purchase their shares. We
could interpret this as a supplier co-opting a buyer—trying to reduce its dependency by convincing
a buyer to make a public commitment that it will not behave opportunistically.
In Japan, shareholders often accompany their equity stake with the dispatch of one or more directors
(Lincoln, Gerlach, and Takahashi, 1992), offering further opportunity for a supplier to co-opt a buyer
through director interlocks.
There is, however, one very important difference between co-optation and the logic of commitment
that I argue is more descriptive of these buyer-supplier relationships. Co-optation suggests one party
unilaterally managing its dependence on another. A supplier co-opts an automaker because it is in its
own best interest to do so—whether this co-optation benefits the automaker or not is of no concern.
The notion of credible commitments, on the other hand, highlights the cooperation involved in a
linkage between automaker and supplier. An automaker holds shares of a supplier to assure the
supplier that it will not act opportunistically. This is in the best interest of both the supplier and
automaker. For this reason, a credible commitment, with its emphasis on benefits to both parties, is
a more apt description of linkages between Japanese automakers and their suppliers. 
Supply networks and power
The analyses in this paper are consistent with other research on supplier networks in Japan in finding
that relationships between automakers and suppliers are reciprocal and cooperative. Equity from
automaker to supplier is not a means of exploitation as set out in the dual economy perspective.
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Neither is it a means for suppliers and buyers to unilaterally manage their depend ncies, as in resource
dependence theory. The analyses presented here indicate that contrary to resour e dependence theory,
automakers are no more likely to hold shares of suppliers when there ae few alternative suppliers and
are even more likely to hold shares of suppliers of parts that they produce internally.
Yet power cannot be dismissed for several reasons. The first is asymmetry in size of equity linkage.
Automakers hold larger stakes in their suppliers than vice versa. I argued that the role of equity ties
in managing exchange is largely symbolic. Yet automakers that have equity in suppliers hold an
average of 15.6%. While an automaker may not use this influence to exploit a supplier—to obtain
higher eturns, or force dependence—it may use its influence in other ways. Shareholders fulfilling
their obligation to keep affiliates afloat may take dras ic measures such as replacing management and
redirecting strategy. What appears as a rescue to some is likely to be interpreted as an exercise of
power by supplier managers who have lost their jobs.
Equity ties from automakers also represent a valuable resource to a supplier—and for this reason, an
equity link from automaker to supplier has a different meaning from a link extending from supplier
to automaker. An equity tie from an automaker is a source of legitimacy for a supplier, critical in the
Japanese conomy where smaller firms and suppliers tend to be lower in status, and have more
difficult access to human and financial capital. Sup liers known to be closely affiliated to automakers
often receive preferential interest rates from banks (Dyer, 1996). Suppliers, an auto industry manager
told me, greatly desire a customer's equity participation, so that they can proudly put “Affiliate of
Automaker X” on their signboards. This signal of higher status will help them in recruiting employees,
important in an economy where small firms are considered less desirable places to work. It will even
help them find other customers, who are relieved to know that a large automaker considers them
reliable. Public approval of an automaker opens doors for a supplier—and desire to obtain thi
approval may constrain a supplier’s behavior. Consequently, an equity stake in a supplier may be a
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source of power for an automaker, even if the automaker does not use this power to directly
dominate and control the supplier.
Where do equity ties come from? 
The finding that equity ties function as credible commitments does not necessarily mean that these
ties were consciously and deliberately crafted to play such a role. In the cross-sectional data set
analyzed in this paper, it is impossible to determine whether or not automakers actually purchased
supplier shares to anticipate or respond to increasing levels of ass t specificity. There is, however,
intriguing evidence in other archival materials, particularly published company histories, that the
direction of causality is reversed—and the characteristics of transactions evolved to match a
governance structure already in place. 
Many automakers and suppliers attribute initial purchases of shares to reasons far removed from the
management of transactions. In their accounts, automakers purchased suppliers' shares as protection from foreign takeover, or as capital infusions
when a supplier was short of cash or needed to invest in development of new technologies or skills. A manager (of a large consumer electronics firm) offered me an
example of how requirements of a ransaction could evolve in the course of a relationship. He described a supplier of simple VCR parts, whose business had disappears
as its customer moved VCR production overseas. To save the supplier, his firm moved to it a semiconductor equipment manufacturing line—a completely different
business, requiring significantly higher levels of skill and specific investments.
A similar line of reasoning can explain the evolution of supply relations in the auto industry. There is evidence that automakers established equity links to their suppliers
in the 1950’s and 1960’s (Japan FTC, 1991), before the specific-investment-requiring institutions of the kanba  ystem, joint product development, value analysis and
value engineering had developed significantly. Many of these innovations came from Toyota—a firm that had equity stakes in quite a few suppliers in the early post-war
years. Did Toyota’s existing web of equity relationships provide a governance structure that encouraged suppliers to make specific investments, and allow the
innovations known today as Japanese purchasing practices? 
Japanese management practices, ranging from manufacturing systems to human resource management, are often described as deliberately, thoughtfully constructed
systems. Sabel (1994), for example, identifies collaboration between customers and suppliers as an example of evolution through learning. Aoki (1988) and others
37
who explain Japanese practices in the context of economic models do not pay much attention to their evolution—but imply that they are a deliberately crafted, rational
set of institutions. Historical analyses of the development of these practices, however, indicates a more path dependent process. Gordon (1985) describes how human
resource policies in Japan were, in part, a response to labor unrest after World War II.  Recent research on the development of Japanese manufacturing systems
suggests that the evolution from a Fordist to Toyota system of production was in part, due to trial and error and path dependence (Shioji, 1994). 
The relationship between cross-shareholding among Japanese automakers and their suppliers and the development of a unique system of purchasing management,
in which suppliers invest heavily in customer-specific assets, may be the result of an evolutionary process (Nelson and Winter, 1982), in which the characteristics of
the transaction evolved to match an existing governance structure of equity ties. More research on this co-evolution of governance structure and transaction through
longitudinal analysis of the extension of equity ties and evolution of purchasing relationships is necessary. 
CONCLUSION
This research has a number of implications for organization theory. First, it demonstrates that
embeddeness and transaction cost economics are not mutually exclusive. Equity ties between
Japanese automakers and their suppliers are embedded in the sense that much of their significance
derives from factors specific to the Japanese economy. These ties also play a role consistent with
transaction cost economics—they serve as a public commitment that an automaker will not take
advantage of a supplier that has made relationship-specific investments. 
This complementarity of transaction cost economics and embeddedness suggests an alternative
approach to comparative research—one which combines case-specific analysis with generalizable
theory. Purportedly universal theories, such as transaction costs economics, can be powerful if we
carefully shape their assumptions to reflect social, cultural, and institutional realities. This paper
demonstrates that transaction cost economics is a useful framework to understand buyer-supplier
relationships in Japan, provided that we understand what governance means in a Japanese context,
in particular, the symbolic significance of equity. 
Second, this research demonstrates a logic of commitment in relationships between Japanese
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automakers and suppliers. Automakers hold shares of their suppliers not to control them, but rather
as symbols of affiliation and obligation. This is counter to the dual economy perspective, according
to which automakers and other large Japanese manufacturers holding shares of their suppliers to
better control and extract rents from them. This is also counter to a resource dependence view of
interorganizational relationships, in which individual organizations extend linkages to others
strategically, to reduce dependenc  and stabilize transactions in an uncertain world. The governance
of buyer-supplier relationships in the Japanese automotive industry is not a matter of control, but
rather, a set of highly symbolic, though nevertheless real, commitments. 
From a more managerial standpoint, this research suggests limits to the argument that Japanese
supply practices are a new paradigm, applicable anywhere in the world (cf. Nishiguchi, 1994).
Japanese supply relations are embedded in an environment in which credible commitments from
automaker to supplier are taken very seriously. Cross-shareholding provides a readily available means
for a buyer to signal its commitment to a supplier. Without such a governance structure in place, it
is not possible to replicate Japanese supply practices exactly. Indeed, there is evidence that while U.S.
makers have begun to adopt the form of these practices—e.g. increased cooperation with fewer
suppliers (Liker et al., 1995)—they have been much slower in adopting the substance, in particular,
the notion that an automaker has an obligation to protect its supplier (Helper, 1991).
The Japanese auto industry is in a period of change. Overseas production, reduction of capacity,
standardization of parts, and increasing importance of new technologies such as automotive
electronics have caused suppliers and automakers to rethink their traditional relationships (Ahmadjian
and Lincoln, 1997). Announcements of automakers purchasing parts from suppliers of rival groups
and even internalizing production of critical par s (e.g. Toyota’s internalization of some manufacture
of semiconductors) are evidence that supply networks are changing. It will be interesting to observe
how—and if—equity linkages between automaker and suppliers and the obligations associated with
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them, change along with the relationships. 
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Table 1: Number of relationships, various statistics, 11 automakers 
Maker # dyads % suppliers% of total average % average % average % of inputs
with equity supplier of inputs of of a number of of a part
tie shares helda part supplier's parts manufactu
by purchased output of a purchased r-ed
customers from a part from a internally 




Toyota 100 .66 .21 .48 .59 14 .08
Nissan 101 .57 .29 .48 .65 6.9 .07
Isuzu 86 .21 .16 .49 .26 5.5 .01
Honda 88 .27 .30 .53 .46 3.9 .02
Mazda 93 .12 .20 .48 .31 6.6 .01
Mitsubishi 109 .13 .16 .42 .32 4.3 .03
N i s s an 86 .05 .09 .51 .10 2.6 .01
Diesel
Daihatsu 79 .06 .39 .59 .18 10.9 .03
Suzuki 90 .03 .10 .52 .20 8.2 .02
Fuji 79 .02 .02 .58 .23 4.4 .007
Hino 73 .12 .13 .56 .12 3.8 .04
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Table 2: Means, correlations, 130 auto parts, 11 automakers  and 237 suppliers 
mean 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
(sd)
1 if shares of supplier i .16 1 .49 .39 .12 .08 .17 .14 .06 -.09 .04 -.08 .35 .11 .62 .02
 are held by
automaker j (.36)




1 .31 .14 .02 .09 .14 .12 -.12 .09 -.17 .37 .001 .36 .15
PCTSU:% of output of supplier i
purc s d by automaker j
.30
(.33)
1 .10 .41 .28 .07 .10 -.03 -.22 -.16 .38 .04 .42 .16
PCTCU:% of output of automaker j
purchased from  supplier i
.44
(.29)
1 -.13 -.22 .13 .12 .05 -.04 -.10 -.2- -.04 .07 .06
# of suppliers per part 7.29
(3.73)
1 .21 -.04 .07 .01 -.24 -.,17 .04 -.11 .15 -
.003
% automaker j input of parts procured
from supplier i  produced internally
.04
(.14)
1 -.04 .02 -.08 -.04 .03 .14 .13 .19 .11
total number of parts supplied by supplier
i to automaker j 
2.22
(3.13)
1 .04 -.04 .09 .21 .06 .01 .13 .06
year of supplier i’s founding 40.54
(16.34)
1 .01 -.24 -.29 .04 -.12 .13 .19
year of automaker j’s founding 45.29
(15.14)
1 -.02 -.02 -.09 -.03 -.05 .06
1 if supplier i  is listed .71
(.45)
1 .56 -.03 .11 -.15 NA
ln of supplier i’s assets 10.82
(1.56)
1 -.01 .16 -.11 .16
ln of automaker j’s assets 13.64
(.90)
1 -.03 .22 .022
average difficulty of manufacture of parts





% of supplier i shares held by automaker j.03
(.11)
1 . 05





Table 3: Estimates of logit regressions of automaker and supplier equity ties on selected explanatory variables, 130
auto parts, 11 automakers  and 237  suppliers 
1=automaker 1=automaker 1=automaker 1=automaker 
equity share equity share equity share equity share 
in supplier in supplier in supplier in supplier
PCTSU: % of output of supplier i sold to 1.872*** 1.961*** 2.332*** 2.185***
automaker j (.422) (.429) (.398) (.426)
PCTCU:% of output of automaker j sold to2.209*** 2.509*** 2.547*** 1.788***
supplier i (.472) (.493) (.478) (.448)
# of suppliers per part .010 -.013 .004 .022
(.035) (.036) (.034) (.037)
% automaker j  input of parts procured 1.865* 2.549*** 1.813**
from supplier i  produced internally(.744) (.767) (.699)
total number of parts supplied by supplier i.111*** .105** .116*** .114***
to automaker j (.0321) (.032) (.033) (.033)
year of supplier i’s founding .007 .006 .003 .013
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008)
year of automaker j’s founding -.001 -.0007 -.001
(.008) (.008) (.007)
1 if supplier i  is listed 2.298*** 2.317*** 1.961*** 2.338***
(.368) (.379) (.342) (.379)
ln of supplier i’s assets -.555*** .509 -.502*** -.507***
(.098) (.261) (.097) (.099)
ln of automaker j’s assets .949*** .994*** .969***
(.150) (.154) (.152)
average difficulty of manufacture of parts .998*** 6.596*** .860*** .895***
supplied by supplier i: 3=very difficult, (.204) (1.387) (.193) (.214)
1=very simple
difficulty of manufacture*ln of supplier i’s -.526***
assets (.127)
1 if automaker =Toyota 3.074***
(.406)
1 if automaker =Nissan 3.077***
(.410)
1 if automaker =Mitsubishi Motors 1.291**
(.433)
1 if automaker =Honda 1.723***
(.410)
1 if automaker =Mazda .644
(.505)
1 if automaker =Isuzu 1.383**
(.439)
1 if engine part .202
(.289)
if transmission part 1.425***
(.414)
if steering part 1.256*
(.515)
if suspension part .327
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(.514)
















log-likelihood (l1) -262.13 -253.14 -269.757 -257.45
.38 .41 .37 .40
pseudo-R 1/l0)
2 (1-l
number of dyads 984 984 984 984
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
1. Slope estimates with standard errors in parentheses. l1 is the log-likelihood for full model with intercept and
covariates. l0 is the log-likelihood for intercept only model. Pseudo- R         predictor
2 is 1 when the model is a perfect
predictor and 0 when l1=l0. It can be interpreted as the percent of the total "uncertainty" explained by the model Judge
et al. 1985).
52
Table 4: Estimates of tobit and OLS regressions of automaker and supplier equity ties on selected explanatory
variables, 130  auto parts, 11 automakers  and 237  suppliers 
% automaker 





s u p p l i e r s-
OLS—equity
dyads only
















% automaker j  input of parts procured





total number of parts supplied by supplier

























average difficulty of manufacture of parts



















number of dyads 984 984
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
1. Slope estimates with standard errors in parentheses. l
1 is the log-likelihood for full model with intercept and
covariates. l0 is the log-likelihood for intercept only model. Pseudo- R        predictor
2 is 1 when the model is a perfect
predictor and 0 when l1=l0. It can be interpreted as the percent of the total "uncertainty" explained by the model
(Judge et al. 1985).
53
Table 5: Estimates of logit and tobit regressions of automaker and supplier equity ties on selected explanatory











































































% automaker j input of parts procured
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log-likelihood (l1) -181.22 -155.13 -28.89 -310.45 -292.77 519.13
.42 .51 .84 .27 .31 .65
pseudo-R 1/l0)
2 (1-l
number of dyads 698 698 698 672 672 672
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
1. Slope estimates with standard errors in parentheses. l1 is the log-likelihood for full model with intercept and covariates. l0 is
the log-likelihood for intercept only model. Pseudo- R         
2 is 1 when the model is a perfect
predictor and 0 when l1=l0. It can be interpreted as the percent of the total "uncertainty" explained by the model
 (Judge et al. 1985).
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